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Note 
 
In Deep Water: A Common Law Solution to the 
Bulk Water Export Problem 
Elise L. Larson 
The end of a world without large-scale bulk water exports 
may be near.1 Although previously deemed economically incon-
ceivable, the growing problem of global water scarcity makes 
the sale of bulk water—large-scale international shipment of 
water by man-made diversion2—a potentially profitable enter-
prise.3 An American company recently announced its plan to 
enter this newly developing market through its completion of a 
contract with the town of Sitka, Alaska.4 The company plans to 
export 2.9 billion gallons of freshwater per year from the Blue 
Lake Reservoir to an unannounced water hub on the west coast 
of India.5 If this venture is successful, the company will not on-
ly become the first in the United States to ship large-volume 
exports of water by tanker, but the first in the world.6 Since 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2009, 
Concordia College. The author thanks Professor Bradley Karkkainen for his 
advice and guidance, and Jeremy Harrell, Laura Arneson, and Nathan Wersal 
for their helpful comments throughout the process. Copyright © 2011 by Elise 
L. Larson. 
 1. See, e.g., Brett Walton, Alaska City Set to Ship Water to India, U.S. 
Company Announces, CIRCLE OF BLUE WATERNEWS (July 11, 2010, 2:49 PM), 
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2010/world/north-america/alaska-city-set-
to-ship-water-to-india-u-s-company-announces/. 
 2. This definition of bulk water will be used throughout this Note. 
 3. See Ariel Dinar & Aaron Wolf, International Markets for Water and 
Potential for Regional Cooperation: Economic and Political Perspectives in the 
Western Middle East, 43 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 43, 43, 61–62 
(1994) (finding that, with developments in technology, the application econom-
ic models to trade in water resources may show increased regional develop-
ments in some areas of the world). See generally U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HU-
MAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: BEYOND SCARCITY 134–37 (2006), available 
at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR06-complete.pdf (discussing the current 
and future problems relating to water scarcity around the world).  
 4. Walton, supra note 1.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  
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this plan was announced, the Alaska Department of Natural 
Resources received three new applications to remove Alaskan 
water for international trade.7 These permit applications il-
lustrate a growing international trend: as water resources are 
depleted, water-poor areas around the world will search for op-
portunities to purchase water as a commodity.8 This new thirst 
for bulk water will undoubtedly encourage the expansion of this 
industry, creating new conflicts between the states‘ traditional 
authority to regulate their water resources and the limits 
placed on water resources if subject to international trade 
agreements. 
Many scholars hypothesize about the impact international 
agreements may have on traditional water right structures in 
the United States. One concern is that the actual export of wa-
ter internationally may cause ―bulk water‖ to be defined as a 
―good‖ or ―product‖ subject to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement9 (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade10 (GATT).11 This categorization may result in the 
potentially serious domestic consequence of limiting a state‘s 
ability to regulate its water resources.12 Other consequences 
may include: discouraging investment by domestic companies; 
injuring ecosystems;13 and infringing upon the availability to 
the public of its most valuable resource.14 
 
 7. Brett Walton, Alaska Receives New Applications for Bulk Water Re-
moval, CIRCLE OF BLUE WATERNEWS (July 8, 2010, 11:45 AM), http://www 
.circleofblue.org/waternews/2010/world/north-america/alaska-receives-new 
-applications-for-bulk-water-removal/. 
 8. Cynthia Baumann, Water Wars: Canada’s Upstream Battle to Ban 
Bulk Water Export, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 109, 109 (2001). 
 9. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 301, Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. xi, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 11. See Scott Philip Little, Canada’s Capacity to Control the Flow: Water 
Export and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 PACE INT‘L L. REV. 
127, 139–41 (1996). 
 12. See Noah D. Hall, Protecting Freshwater Resources in the Era of Glob-
al Water Markets: Lessons Learned from Bottled Water, 13 U. DENV. WATER L. 
REV. 1, 2–7 (2009) (discussing the potential harm to society and the environ-
ment through the removal of water for bottling).  
 13. See POLICY RESEARCH INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
BRIEFING NOTE: EXPORTING CANADA‘S WATER I: OUTSIDE OF NAFTA, at 3 
(2005), available at http://www.horizons.gc.ca/doclib/SD_BN_ExportingWater_E 
.pdf (describing the potential environmental risks associated with bulk water 
shipment).  
 14. See Baumann, supra note 8, at 129. 
 2011] BULK WATER EXPORT PROBLEM 741 
 
The power to protect water resources under international 
trade lies largely in the hands of state governments because 
water rights are a form of property.15 States‘ police powers al-
low them to control property rights in water resources through 
statute, regulation, and permitting systems.16 Traditionally, 
state legislative power restricts the amount of water that be-
comes an article of commerce because a resource must be ex-
tracted, used, and incorporated into a product before it becomes 
a ―good‖ for the purposes of trade law.17 However, state and lo-
cal governments also have an incentive to allow the export of 
bulk water for short-term financial gain.18 This Note argues 
that because the legislature both holds the power to distribute 
water rights and possesses the potential to benefit financially 
by selling those rights in international trade, further protec-
tions are needed to prevent the allocation of state water re-
sources for bulk export.  
In Part I, this Note provides a brief overview of NAFTA 
and GATT, and their potential interference with the state regu-
lation of water resources. This Part also supplies a brief over-
view of global water scarcity, American water law, and the pub-
lic trust doctrine. Part II discusses the circumstances under 
which state and federal courts have applied the public trust 
doctrine and how this movement is applicable to bulk water ex-
ports. Part III asserts that the best remedy to solve the tension 
between international-trade law and state regulation of water 
resources is for state courts to apply the public trust doctrine to 
the allocation of permits for international trade.  
I.  PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WATER AND THEIR INTERPLAY 
WITH INTERNATIONAL TREATIES   
Global water scarcity is the fuel driving the new market of 
bulk water export.19 This Part describes this growing problem. 
As the bulk water market grows, exporting this resource will 
impact both the economic and political spheres of countries 
around the world. In the United States, the export of bulk-
 
 15. See Scott S. Slater, State Water Resource Administration in the Free 
Trade Agreement Era: As Strong as Ever, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 649, 651–54 
(2007). 
 16. See id.  
 17. Hall, supra note 12, at 3.  
 18. The city of Sitka, Alaska, for example, has the potential to make $90 
million per year by exporting bulk water. Walton, supra note 1.  
 19. See Baumann, supra note 8. 
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water forms the intersection of three large bodies of law: first, 
state water rights20 under the police powers giving state legis-
latures the authority to regulate and permit the waters within 
their territories; second, international trade law under NAFTA 
and GATT; and third, common law doctrines, specifically the 
public trust doctrine. This Part provides a discussion of these 
areas of law and describes how each applies to bulk water  
exports.  
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF GLOBAL WATER SCARCITY  
Water is a unique natural resource in both the variety and 
importance of the needs it satisfies.21 Water‘s array of essential 
functions include: providing sustenance to humans, crops, and 
livestock; creating habitat for fish and other aquatic organisms; 
fulfilling both recreational and aesthetic needs; and purifying 
the air.22 This diversity of uses creates competition among wa-
ter users, especially since, as one commentator noted, ―there is 
not always enough water of the right quality in the right place 
at the right time.‖23 Uneven geographical distribution is ex-
acerbated by population growth, climate change, and over-
pumping domestic resources causing global water scarcity in 
certain regions of the world.24 As a result, the World Health 
Organization estimates that over one billion people lack access 
to a basic water supply.25 This number is expected to increase 
to three billion people by 2025 as water stress increases in 
parts of China, India, and Sub-Saharan Africa.26 As a conse-
quence, lack of this essential resource drives the new market 
for bulk water.27 
As this market develops, American legislators and courts 
must determine how domestic law and policy will respond to 
 
 20. See generally WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 10–11 (2d ed. 1988) 
(explaining that water rights are legal rights and that ―a legal right is a legal-
ly enforceable expectation,‖ meaning ―that other people have enforceable du-
ties toward a rightholder‖).  
 21. See, e.g., DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1 (3d ed. 
1997).  
 22. See, e.g., id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Note, What Price for the Priceless?: Implementing the Justiciability of 
the Right to Water, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2007).  
 25. See WORLD HEALTH ORG. & U.N. CHILDREN‘S FUND, GLOBAL WATER 
SUPPLY AND SANITATION ASSESSMENT 2000 REPORT 1 (2000), available at 
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/jmp2000.pdf. 
 26. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 14.  
 27. See Baumann, supra note 8. 
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the growing international need for freshwater resources. In re-
lation to state rights, water exports will interact with both sta-
tutory water rights and judicial common law doctrines as water 
is redefined within this new market and by the terms of inter-
national treaties.  
B. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Two fundamental aspects of American water law are es-
sential to a discussion of bulk water exports. First, water rights 
are a species of property rights28 and are subject to the police 
powers of a state.29 As a result, state common and statutory 
law determines the terms and conditions by which water rights 
are obtained.30 Second, water rights are usufructuary rights, 
meaning other people have the right to the benefits of another‘s 
water.31 This means a legal right to remove water must be ex-
ercised with deference to the impact of one‘s use upon other wa-
ter right holders,32 the public at large,33 and the environment.34 
This Section explains these two aspects of water law. 
 
 28. See, e.g., Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 29 
P.2d 1009, 1011 (Idaho 1934) (―A water right is real property . . . .‖ (citation 
omitted)); N. Ohio Traction & Light Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 152 N.E. 5, 9 
(Ohio 1926) (―A water right is a species of property in and of itself . . . .‖ (cita-
tion omitted)).  
 29. See Slater, supra note 15, at 661. 
 30. Id. at 665–66. 
 31. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1685 (9th ed. 2009); see also, e.g., Eddy v. 
Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) (―[T]he right of property in water is usufruc-
tuary . . . .‖ (emphasis omitted)).  
 32. E.g., Bernard v. City of St. Louis, 189 N.W. 891, 893 (Mich. 1922) 
(holding that right holders are required only ―not to interfere with an ade-
quate supply of water for the plaintiffs‘ reasonable use‖); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 850, 850A (2010). 
 33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979); see also, e.g., Diack 
v. City of Portland, 759 P.2d 1070, 1078 (Or. 1988) (holding the commissioner 
must consider ―[t]he prevention of wasteful, uneconomic, impracticable or un-
reasonable use of waters involved‖ when looking at the public interest); State 
v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492, 498 (Wis. 1983) (holding that the subordinate rights 
of riparian owners are ―subject to the public‘s paramount right and interest‖). 
 34. See, e.g., Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 448–49 (Idaho 1985) (citing 
Idaho law requiring environmental considerations when issuing permits for 
water rights); In re Eigenheer, 453 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) 
(holding that the Minnesota permitting system must conserve the ―valuable 
resource‖ (citation omitted)); Stempel v. Dep‘t of Water Res., 508 P.2d 166, 172 
(Wash. 1973) (applying Washington law to find that permits may be issued 
only if conditioned on the protection of the health of the natural environment).  
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Under the state police powers, a person obtains water 
rights in a variety of ways.35 Generally, water-right regimes 
can be split into three categories: (1) common law riparian; (2) 
riparian with administrative permitting; and (3) prior appro-
priation.36 The basic premise of riparian common law is that a 
riparian owner—a person owning land which borders a stream 
or lake—has the right to take water for use on her land.37 The 
right to extract water is a consequence of riparian land owner-
ship.38 As a result, water rights cannot be lost by disuse be-
cause the right is tied to the ownership of a specific kind of 
property.39  
The nature of the riparian system puts non-riparians with 
water needs at a severe disadvantage because water rights are 
attained through property ownership and are not transfera-
ble.40 Thus, many common law riparian states have enacted 
administrative-permitting systems to allocate water outside the 
common law regime.41 Under this riparian-with-
administrative-permitting system, non-riparians can acquire 
water right by obtaining permits from a state administrative 
agency.42  
The last major water allocation system is known as the 
prior appropriations doctrine.43 Under common law prior ap-
propriations, water rights are not obtained through land own-
ership; instead, taking water and applying it to a beneficial use 
is the only way to acquire it.44 Most prior appropriation states 
have adopted this doctrine by statute.45 Generally, these statu-
 
 35. See Slater, supra note 15, at 664.  
 36. See GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 26, 33. 
 37. J.W. Milliman, Water Law and Private Decision-Making: A Critique, 2 
J.L. & ECON. 41, 42 (1959).  
 38. Id. Within this general category, owners of riparian water rights may 
be subject to one of two allocation theories, natural flow or reasonable use. See 
GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 22–24. These allocation methods are the terms 
by which a riparian owner‘s right is impinged by the public‘s usufructuary 
rights, discussed later in this section. See id. 
 39. See JOSEPH L. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING & POLICY: CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 1 (1968).  
 40. GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 24.  
 41. See George William Sherk, Eastern Water Law, 1 NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV‘T, Winter 1986, at 7, 9. 
 42. See GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 26.  
 43. See SAX, supra note 39, at 2.  
 44. See Milliman, supra note 37, at 42–43.  
 45. See Amber L. Weeks, Student Article, Defining the Public Interest: 
Administrative Narrowing and Broadening of the Public Interest in Response 
to Statutory Silence of Water Codes, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255, 259 (2010) 
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tory formulations approve appropriations in water, determine 
priorities for allotment, and administer the right to distribute 
water.46 Regardless of the type of system used, each state pre-
scribes a set of terms and conditions by which a person may ob-
tain water rights.47 
Once an individual obtains a water right, it is not absolute 
because water is usufructuary and therefore remains subject to 
public ownership to a certain degree.48 As one commentator 
noted, ―[w]ater is legally and historically a public resource,‖49 
meaning that water in its natural state is considered public 
property and belongs to the citizens of the state collectively.50 
This gives the state power to regulate water use against its own 
citizens and the federal government regardless of whether that 
party owns the right to remove water.51 Therefore, a property 
right in water is distinguishable from that in land because the 
owner has a right to the use of the resource, but not to the ac-
tual property itself.52  
Therefore, the state has customarily housed the power to 
regulate water resources through both allocation methods and 
enforcement of other citizens‘ rights. With the development of 
the bulk water export market, this structure may change as it 
is forced to interact with international agreements. The next 
 
(―Every prior appropriation state except for Colorado has delegated quasi-
judicial authority to state administrative agencies or state engineers to admi-
nister both new allocations, or permits, and changes in water rights, or  
transfers.‖). 
 46. See SAX, supra note 39, at 2–3.  
 47. Slater, supra note 15, at 665.  
 48. See id. at 650, 662–63 (―[W]hether water rights are derived as an in-
cident of land ownership or by compliance with common law or statutory re-
quirements, they are usufructuary property rights in a shared public re-
source and vest only to make use of the common supply and, even then, not 
without regard to the impact of one‘s use upon others and the environment.‖).  
 49. GETCHES, supra note 21, at 11.  
 50. GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 11; e.g., State v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492, 
498 (Wis. 1983) (holding that the subordinate rights of riparian owners are 
―subject to the public‘s paramount right and interest‖). 
 51. GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 11. It should be noted that the states are 
subject to the Takings Clause if they appropriate water once water rights are 
vested in a private party. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. 
of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010) (holding that the Takings Clause 
applies to the taking of a landowner‘s riparian rights); Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 
U.S. 497, 504 (1870). 
 52. See Town of Chino Valley v. Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1328 (Ariz. 1981) 
(holding that the right to groundwater is usufructuary); Rock Creek Ditch & 
Flume Co. v. Miller, 17 P.2d 1074, 1076–77 (Mont. 1933) (holding that the 
owner of a water right does not own the corpus of the stream).  
 746 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:739 
 
Section will discuss two major trading agreements and how 
they may impact the current American water-rights structure.  
C. IMPLICATIONS OF GATT AND NAFTA ON AMERICAN WATER 
RESOURCES 
Historically, water has not been exported in bulk and, 
therefore, concern that international agreements would inte-
ract with domestic regulatory regimes was minimal.53 However, 
with the spawning of a new market in bulk water export, the 
potential interaction of these two bodies of law could reduce the 
ability of domestic law to regulate resources over which it tra-
ditionally had full control.  
1. Application of GATT to Bulk Water Export 
Originally designed to provide an international forum to 
encourage free trade and resolve trade disputes, GATT was the 
initial step toward the development of a worldwide trade re-
gime.54 With the formation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1994, GATT now provides the basic legal structure 
that governs international trade between WTO members.55 
GATT defines all commodities that may be traded by WTO 
members in the ―Harmonized Tariff Schedule‖ (HTS).56 Fresh-
water is included under Section 2201.57 This inclusion is rele-
vant to the discussion of bulk water because ―[t]he existence of 
an HTS number means that there is a mechanism under which 
shipments of fresh water can be processed by . . . customs or-
 
 53. Cf. Dinar & Wolf, supra note 3, at 43 (finding that technology allows 
an export market in water).  
 54. Rona Nardone, Like Oil and Water: The WTO and the World’s Water 
Resources, 19 CONN. J. INT‘L L. 183, 198 (2003).  
 55. Slater, supra note 15, at 655–56. At the time this Note was written, 
the agreement governs the trade relations between 153 countries. Members 
and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 23, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.  
 56. PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., THE NEW ECONOMY OF WATER: THE RISKS 
AND BENEFITS OF GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF FRESH WATER 16 
(2002), available at http://www.pacinst.org/reports/new_economy_of_water/new_ 
economy_of_water.pdf; see also Jerome Hinkle, Troubled Waters: Policy and Ac-
tion in the Great Lakes, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 281, 299 (2003).  
 57. Section 2201 defines water as ―including natural or artificial mineral 
waters and aerated waters, not containing added sugar or other sweetening 
matter nor flavored; ice and snow.‖ U.S. INT‘L TRADE COMM‘N, PUB. NO. 4201, 
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, at ch. 22-3 (1st rev. 
ann. 2011), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/ 
1101htsa.pdf. 
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ganizations . . . .‖58 Therefore, at least in theory, GATT already 
has a structure to support trade in bulk water.59 
With the formation of a new bulk water market, it is feared 
that GATT Article XI may supersede state regulation of water 
once one member allows exportation.60 Article XI, Section 1 
states:  
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other 
measures . . . shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting 
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other 
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any prod-
uct destined for the territory of any other contracting party.61 
Article XI, Section 1, then prevents states from prohibiting 
or restricting the export of the ―good‖ and requires continued 
trading even if exports are damaging to the environment.62 If a 
nation decides to allow private companies to ship water in bulk, 
as currently written, Article XI would play a major role in de-
termining the ability of governments to regulate their own 
freshwater resources.  
Other portions of GATT may also apply to the export of 
bulk water because the treaty creates exceptions for ―exhausti-
ble‖ resources.63 For example, Article XX, Sections (b) and (g) 
allows domestic protection of freshwater resources for ―‗exhaus-
tible natural resources‘ or resources that are ‗necessary to pro-
tect human, animal, or plant life or health.‘‖64 However, to limit 
exports in this manner, the national government must also re-
strict domestic consumption to show the policy is in defense of 
natural resources and not at matter of economic protection-
ism.65 Therefore, even with the provisions intended to protect 
 
 58. GLEICK ET AL., supra note 56.  
 59. See id.  
 60. See Slater, supra note 15, at 657–59. 
 61. GATT, supra note 10, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224–26.  
 62. Robert J. Girouard, Water Export Restrictions: A Case Study of WTO 
Dispute Settlement Strategies and Outcomes, 15 GEO. INT‘L ENVTL. L. REV. 
247, 252 (2002). 
 63. Nardone, supra note 54, at 200. See generally GLEICK ET AL., supra 
note 56, at 5 (articulating how water can be both a renewable and non-
renewable resource).  
 64. Nardone, supra note 54, at 200 (quoting GATT, supra note 10, 55 
U.N.T.S. at 262).  
 65. Id. at 200–01. GATT Article XX must be read in conjunction with the 
introductory clauses of the Article, so exceptions cannot be ―applied in a man-
ner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion between countries.‖ PAUL B. STEPHAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
AND ECONOMICS LAW AND POLICY 912–13 (3d ed. 2004) (quoting and discuss-
ing GATT, supra note 10, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262).  
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exhaustible resources from exploitation, GATT may limit the 
ability of states to regulate their waters for the benefit of citi-
zens at large.  
However, the shipment of bulk water not only implicates 
GATT, but also NAFTA. The next Subsection will discuss how 
application of NAFTA to bulk water export is both related to 
and different from application under GATT.  
2. Application of NAFTA to Bulk Water Export  
NAFTA is an international trade agreement between Mex-
ico, Canada, and the United States.66 This agreement is essen-
tially a regional extension of GATT67 that seeks to lower trade 
barriers, promote fair competition, increase cross-border in-
vestment, and create a forum for dispute resolution.68 
Chapter Three of NAFTA requires that each party ―accord 
national treatment to the goods of another Party in accordance 
with Article III‖ of GATT.69 This incorporation of GATT ―re-
quire[s] the national treatment of goods and prohibit[s] quan-
titative restrictions on imports and exports of products.‖70 This 
language could prevent all three members of NAFTA from 
enacting import-export restrictions on water traded in bulk, re-
gardless of damage to the environment or limitations on the lo-
cal population‘s water supply needs.71  
Chapter 11 of NAFTA also has implications for bulk water, 
because it forces nations to afford foreign and domestic inves-
tors equal treatment under trade law.72 Under Article 1102 of 
NAFTA, parties are required to ―extend treatment no less fa-
vorable to investors and investments of another Party than 
that which is accorded to similar [domestic] interests.‖73 Thus, 
 
 66. Slater, supra note 15, at 656.  
 67. GLEICK ET AL., supra note 56, at 18.  
 68. Slater, supra note 15, at 656. 
 69. NAFTA, supra note 9, 32 I.L.M. at 299–301.  
 70. Slater, supra note 15, at 656.  
 71. See Baumann, supra note 8, at 114–17, 119–23 (analyzing the poten-
tial effect of GATT and NAFTA on Canada‘s efforts to ban bulk water exports); 
Sanford E. Gaines, Fresh Water: Environment or Trade?, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 157 
(2002); J. Owen Saunders, Trade Agreements and Environmental Sovereignty: 
Case Studies from Canada, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171 (1995); Marcia Val-
iante, Harmonization of Great Lakes Water Management in the Shadow of 
NAFTA, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 525, 534 (2004). 
 72. Brian D. Anderson, Selling Great Lakes Water to a Thirsty World: Le-
gal, Policy, & Trade Considerations, 2 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 241 (1999).  
 73. Little, supra note 11, at 144; see also NAFTA, supra note 9, 32 I.L.M. 
at 639. 
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each state must accord the same rights to remove water to for-
eign investors as it does to domestic investors if bulk water is 
subject to NAFTA.74 This provision will restrict the number of 
permits available to domestic parties because the state must 
distribute only a finite number of permits to ensure they do not 
damage the local water supply.75 
After the passage of NAFTA, the Canadian government as-
serted their concern that the language of the agreement would 
subject both the United States and Mexico to ―unlimited access 
to [the country‘s] fresh water resources.‖76 In order to assuage 
this concern, the federal governments of Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico made a joint public statement in 1993 stat-
ing that NAFTA does not apply to bulk water exports.77 How-
ever, this joint statement is ―completely non-binding upon the 
parties.‖78 The U.S. Department of State has said ―governments 
may agree on joint statements of policy or intention that do not 
establish legal obligations.‖79 Thus, the 1993 joint statement 
does not bind the United States, Mexico, and Canada, and the 
NAFTA provisions still apply to the export of bulk water.80 
Provisions of both NAFTA and GATT could impact the 
states‘ traditional legal authority to regulate water resources. 
By creating this new tension between international and domes-
tic frameworks, it is necessary to develop a solution to ensure 
that citizens of the United States are protected from the poten-
tial local impact.  
D. HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND MODERN 
CONCEPTIONS  
State governments in water rich states have an economic 
incentive to sell water in bulk to private enterprises.81 Nothing, 
 
 74. Little, supra note 11, at 146.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 127.  
 77. Christopher Scott Maravilla, The Canadian Bulk Water Moratorium 
and Its Implications for NAFTA, CURRENTS: INT‘L TRADE L.J., Summer 2001, 
at 29, 35. To view the actual joint statement itself, see David Johansen, Water 
Exports and the NAFTA, CAN. (Mar. 8, 1999), http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/ 
Collection-R/LoPBdP/EB/prb995-e.htm. 
 78. Maravilla, supra note 77.  
 79. Memorandum from Robert E. Dalton, Assistant Legal Advisor for 
Treaty Affairs, U.S. Dep‘t of State, International Documents of a Non-Legally 
Binding Character 1 (Mar. 18, 1994), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/65728.pdf.  
 80. Maravilla, supra note 77. 
 81. Cf. Steve Maich, America Is Thirsty, MACLEAN‘S MAG., Nov. 28, 2005, 
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however, assures that legislative or administrative officials 
adequately consider the public interest when determining 
whether to issue permits for bulk water export.82 As a result, 
the public trust doctrine is viable remedy to the potential con-
sequences of bulk water export.83 This conflict illuminates a po-
tential public trust concern: government may have economic 
motives that are not in the best interest of the public. This Sec-
tion will first describe the establishment of the American public 
trust doctrine. The Section continues to describe the scope of 
the public trust doctrine, specifically, how the Supreme Court 
has given state courts the discretion to determine what re-
sources are protected by the doctrine and how jurisdictions 
vary from traditional to broad interpretations.  
1. Establishment of the American Public Trust Doctrine 
The underlying premise behind the public trust doctrine is 
that some resources are always subject to ownership and pro-
tection by the state in trust for the benefit of the public.84 The 
public trust doctrine was assimilated into United States law 
from English common law.85 Early English decisions assumed 
this doctrine was limited to property rights in rivers, seas, and 
seashores that were to be preserved for the public to navigate, 
fish, or use for other purposes.86 The existence of this doctrine 
was confirmed in 1892 by the Supreme Court in Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. v. Illinois.87 The Court held that the public trust 
doctrine limited the state‘s ability to sell or relinquish control 
over submerged lands because they are held ―in trust‖ for the 
 
at 28–30 (reporting that various businesses wanted to buy water from Canada 
to sell to the United States).  
 82. Cf. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: 
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 495 (1970) (―[ I ]t will of-
ten be the case that the whole of the public interest has not been adequately 
considered by the [government] whose conduct has been brought into question.‖). 
 83. Cf. id. at 495–96 (discussing how the public trust doctrine would 
―create through the courts an openness and visibility which is the public‘s 
principal protection against overreaching‖). 
 84. Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing 
Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 702 (2006).  
 85. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of 
the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 828 (2004) (discussing the English common law and its 
application to states). 
 86. Klass, supra note 84.  
 87. 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).  
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public.88 Most importantly, the case explicitly stated that the 
public trust doctrine can override a state statute.89 
2. Contemporary Scope of the Public Trust Doctrine 
Once a court holds that specific natural resources are held 
―in trust,‖ the sovereign has specific duties that are judicially 
enforceable by the public.90 A ruling of this kind creates a state 
duty to preserve and protect the public‘s interest in the re-
source.91 The doctrine protects these interests by restricting 
government authority in three ways: 
first, the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a pub-
lic purpose, but it must be held available for use by the general pub-
lic; second, the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equiva-
lent; and third, the property must be maintained for particular types 
of uses.92 
Even though the public trust doctrine affords a resource 
broad protection under the common law, the Supreme Court 
held that each state defines the reach and application of the 
public trust doctrine within its borders.93 As a result, the scope 
of the doctrine varies considerably from state to state.94  
Whereas some states have taken a restricted view of the doc-
trine, others have interpreted it more broadly.95  
Some state courts have limited the scope of the public trust 
doctrine to the historically recognized areas of navigation and 
fishing.96 The traditional arguments for maintaining this nar-
row scope are the doctrine‘s ―undemocratic nature,‖ the power 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Klass, supra note 84, at 705.  
 90. Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the At-
torney General as the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y F. 57, 75 (2005).  
 91. Id. at 77.  
 92. Sax, supra note 82, at 477.  
 93. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 483 (1988) 
(citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 24 (1893)).  
 94. See Kanner, supra note 90, at 78 (―[A] state has the right to define the 
nature and extent of its property under the common law relating to water in-
terests.‖); Klass, supra note 84 (finding that the public trust doctrine allows 
―variations in scope among the states‖).  
 95. Kanner, supra note 90, at 78.  
 96. See, e.g., Dep‘t of Natural Res. v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 
637–38 (Md. 1975) (refusing to extend the public trust doctrine to dry land al-
though the land at issue was legally considered a part of the waterfront and 
had been improved at the public‘s expense); Op. of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 
561, 566 (Mass. 1974) (refusing to extend the public trust doctrine to beach 
walking).  
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it gives ―noncompetent‖ courts over highly complex administra-
tive decisions, and the danger that courts will undervalue pri-
vate property rights.97 Other state courts have chosen to ex-
pand the public trust doctrine beyond the traditional view.98 
Expansions have included defending use, access, and preserva-
tion of waters which are used for wildlife habitat,99 drinking 
water,100 recreation,101 and inland wetlands.102 Most relevant to 
this Note, some states have also applied this doctrine to resolve 
water appropriation issues and have limited preexisting water 
rights to prevent impermissible limitations on public access, as 
well as harm to the environment, aesthetics, or other natural 
resources.103  
Although the public trust doctrine has been significantly 
broadened in some states, other jurisdictions are reluctant to 
protect resources outside the traditional scope.104 Because the 
 
 97. William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-
Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a 
Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 403 (1997).  
 98. Klass, supra note 84, at 707–08.  
 99. See, e.g., Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 61 (Alaska 1996) (holding that 
wildlife ―occurring in their natural state‖ were ―public assets of the state 
which may not be appropriated by initiative‖); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 
374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (describing tidelands as belonging within the public trust 
because they are ―environments which provide food and habitat for birds and 
marine life‖).  
 100. See, e.g., Mayor of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm‘n, 539 A.2d 
760, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (―[T]he public trust doctrine applies 
with equal impact upon the control of our drinking water reserves.‖), aff ’d, 557 
A.2d 299 (N.J. 1989). 
 101. See, e.g., Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 
(Mont. 1984) (protecting surface waters capable of recreational use under the 
public trust doctrine, ―without regard to streambed ownership or navigability 
for nonrecreational purposes‖).  
 102. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Wis. 1972) 
(finding that swamp lands ―adjacent to or near navigable waters‖ were subject 
to regulation under the state public trust powers).  
 103. See, e.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1121 (Alaska 
1988) (finding ―continuing public easements‖ to protect public access to tide-
lands); In re Wai‗ola O Moloka‗i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 694 (Haw. 2004) (holding 
that reservations of water by a state agency were entitled to protection under 
the public trust doctrine); Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 450 (Idaho 1985) 
(finding that the aesthetic and environmental impacts of a permit grant may 
be given ―great consideration‖ where those priorities match local needs); Unit-
ed Plainsmen Ass‘n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm‘n, 247 N.W.2d 
457, 463 (N.D. 1976) (finding that the public trust doctrine requires some evi-
dence of ―an analysis of present supply and future need‖ before water re-
sources are allocated).  
 104. See Kanner, supra note 90, at 78 (introducing different jurisdictions‘ 
approaches to applying the public trust doctrine). 
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sale of bulk water implicates many of the concerns hallmarked 
in traditional public trust precedent, the central argument of 
this paper focuses on jurisdictions that narrowly interpret the 
public trust doctrine. This Note posits that expansion of the 
public trust doctrine to bulk water exports is narrower than 
more liberal extensions because it is tailored to resolve tradi-
tional concerns. As such, this Note encourages conservative ju-
risdictions to apply the public trust doctrine to bulk water  
exports.  
II.  JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC  
TRUST DOCTRINE   
The Supreme Court gave state courts the discretion to ex-
tend or limit the public trust doctrine.105 Therefore, the use of 
the public trust doctrine to protect a state‘s natural resources 
varies by jurisdiction.106 In order to convince jurisdictions to ex-
tend the public trust doctrine to the appropriation of water 
rights for bulk export, it is necessary to understand the cir-
cumstances where courts have extended the doctrine and how 
the concerns of more conservative jurisdictions can be alle-
viated. This Part first discusses circumstances under which 
courts have extended the doctrine to protect the public interest 
in a resource and provides support for these extensions. Next, it 
argues that the concerns cited by jurisdictions following the 
traditional approach are not implicated by extension to bulk 
water exports. Finding that bulk water exports implicate tradi-
tional concerns about public resources, the Part concludes that 
applying the public trust doctrine is in keeping with the tradi-
tional application of the doctrine by courts.  
A. CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH COURTS HAVE APPLIED THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE  
An assessment of the circumstances where courts apply the 
public trust doctrine is necessary to argue that this doctrine 
should be applied to bulk water sales. This Section outlines  
 
 105. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 483 (1988) 
(―[T]here is no universal and uniform law upon the subject; but . . . each State 
has dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders according to 
its own views of justice and policy.‖ (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 
(1894))).  
 106. Ivan M. Stoner, Comment, Leading a Judge to Water: In Search of a 
More Fully Formed Washington Public Trust Doctrine, 85 WASH. L. REV. 391, 
399–400 (2010).  
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(1) how using the doctrine would prevent the government from 
selling a public resource for temporary economic gain, and (2) 
why some states have already applied the public trust doctrine 
to the appropriation of water. 
1. Federal Application of the Public Trust Doctrine: 
Prohibition of the Export of a Traditionally Public Resource for 
Temporary Economic Gain  
In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the enforceability of the public trust doctrine 
against state legislative actions regarding submerged lands.107 
There are two reasons this case has important implications for 
bulk water. First, the case articulated that the doctrine can 
override state legislative actions, unlike most common law 
principles which can be superseded by statute.108 Second, the 
case houses significant parallels to bulk water exports in the 
kind of legislative power used and the effect that power had on 
the public‘s future use of the resource.  
Illinois Central addressed an 1869 grant, by the Illinois 
legislature, of an interest in more than one thousand acres of 
submerged land within the Chicago Harbor to Illinois Central 
Railroad.109 In 1873, lawmakers changed their minds and re-
pealed the grant, and the State brought a quiet title action 
against the railroad in 1883.110 The Supreme Court upheld the 
State‘s ability to repeal the 1869 grant, deeming the initial 
grant invalid under the public trust doctrine.111  
Although the Court affirmed the State‘s title to the lands 
under Lake Michigan,112 the Court determined that title was 
―different in character‖ from other state-owned lands that can 
be sold to private parties.113 As a result, the Court found that 
―the state‘s control of such lands, for purposes of the trust, ‗can 
never be lost,‘ unless conveyed for uses promoting the interest 
 
 107. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.  
 108. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 455 (1892) (mak-
ing broad references to ―the State‖ and that ―[a]ny grant of the kind is neces-
sarily revocable‖).  
 109. Id. at 438–39, 454; see also Klass, supra note 84, at 703–04; Sax, supra 
note 82, at 489.  
 110. See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 433, 449, 460–61.  
 111. Id. at 454–55, 463–64; Klass, supra note 84, at 704.  
 112. The Court expressly found that submerged lands included not only 
tidelands, but also the Great Lakes and other key inland water bodies. Ill. 
Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 435–37.  
 113. Id. at 452.  
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of the public.‖114 The Court did not, therefore, prohibit the 
State from selling the land to private parties.115 Instead, the 
Court decreed that ―[w]hat a state may not do . . . is to divest 
itself of authority to govern the whole of an area in which it has 
responsibility to exercise its police power.‖116 Like Illinois Cen-
tral, a state‘s action to allow water to be shipped in bulk also 
involves governments rescinding control over a previously regu-
lated resource to achieve a short-term economic gain.117 By 
permitting bulk water shipments, a state government may po-
tentially renounce its right to allocate water resources as it 
deems fit.118 Consequently, the state loses a right which was 
solely under its control.119 Thus, the state ―divest[s] itself of au-
thority to govern the whole of an area in which it has responsi-
bility to exercise its police power;‖ a circumstance not permit-
ted under Illinois Central.120  
The state grant in Illinois Central also resembles the po-
tential consequences of bulk water export because the legisla-
tive action did not create public developments or produce more 
efficient services for the public.121 Likewise, issuing bulk water 
permit for export does not provide the benefits to the public for 
several reasons. First, bulk water exports operate with little 
long-term labor.122 Thus, relative to other water allocation in-
dustries, such as bottled water, the bulk water industry would 
 
 114. Klass, supra note 84, at 704 (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453).  
 115. See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 (―[T]he control of the State for the 
purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in 
promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any 
substantial impairment of the public interest . . . .‖). 
 116. Sax, supra note 82, at 489. 
 117. Cf. Klass, supra note 84, at 705 (―Putting aside its legal groundings, 
Illinois Central stands as an early invocation of the public trust doctrine to 
prevent a state from placing public trust lands into private hands for short-
term economic gain to the detriment of the long-term preservation of the re-
source for the public.‖). 
 118. See Jamie W. Boyd, Note, Canada’s Position Regarding an Emerging 
International Fresh Water Market with Respect to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, 5 NAFTA: L. & BUS. L. REV. AMS. 325, 336 (1999) (arguing 
that under certain provisions of NAFTA ―Canada could lose control over future 
water export projects, however large or small‖).  
 119. See GOLDFARB, supra note 20, at 11. 
 120. See Sax, supra note 82, at 489. 
 121. See id. at 490.  
 122. See ANDREW NIKIFORUK, PROGRAM ON WATER ISSUES, ON THE TABLE: 
WATER, ENERGY AND NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION 19 (Sept. 4, 2007), 
http://www.powi.ca/pdfs/events/powi20070910_9am_On_the_Table.pdf (discuss-
ing how and why the number of jobs created in a bulk water market for Canada 
would be ―minimal‖).  
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provide very few jobs to members of the public.123 The operation 
of exporting bulk water could also depress development in the 
domestic economy by limiting the number of available permits 
for domestic industries.124 Therefore, the government‘s permis-
sion to sell water in bulk is similar to Illinois‘s decision to sell 
the land under its harbor because the water permit would not 
properly promote the interest of the public.  
The parallels between Illinois Central and the developing 
issues related to bulk water export illustrate how this new 
market implicates traditional public trust concerns. As dis-
cussed below, applying the doctrine to bulk water export does 
not force a state court to make highly complex environmental 
decisions or frustrate private property rights to the same de-
gree as other extensions. Jurisdictions that apply the doctrine 
to water appropriation more extensively do, however, provide 
compelling arguments for why conservative state courts should 
extend the doctrine to bulk water export.  
2. Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Water Uses  
The extension of the public trust doctrine is especially im-
portant in the area of water law.125 Because water is necessary 
for survival and critical for economic development,126 it is ob-
vious that states must regulate the tensions between appropri-
ation for historical uses and for modern development.127 How-
 
 123. Id. (―The number of jobs created [through bulk water exports] would 
be minimal and would be largely confined to the maintenance of ships or pipe-
lines.‖); cf. POLICY RESEARCH INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT BRIEF-
ING NOTE: IS THERE A BUSINESS CASE FOR SMALL-SCALE AND LARGE-SCALE 
WATER EXPORT TO THE UNITED STATES? 4 (2007), available at http:// 
www.policyresearch.gc.ca/doclib/BN_SD_BulkWater2_200610_e.pdf (―Relative 
to the value-added bottled water and beverage industries, bulk water export 
would employ very few Canadians per [cubic meter of water] exported. Thus, 
beyond the initial construction phase, bulk exports would bring little employ-
ment to Canadians.‖).  
 124. Cf. NIKIFORUK, supra note 122 (discussing how exporting water would 
be a detriment to the Canadian economy because their major industries, such 
as agriculture, automobile manufacturing, wood, oil, and electricity are water 
dependent, and how reducing the water supply would reduce the water at 
home available to create jobs and maintain those industries).  
 125. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. CO-
LO. L. REV. 317, 336 (1985).  
 126. E.g., GLEICK ET AL., supra note 56, at ii.  
 127. See David Aladjem, The Public Trust Doctrine: New Frontiers for Sus-
tainable Water Resources Management, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV‘T, Summer 
2010, at 17 (―[T]he chief task of the next quarter century will be to attempt to 
balance the various needs for water resources against each other.‖); Wilkinson, 
supra note 125 (―The recognition of the public trust doctrine in water law is 
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ever, given water‘s usufructuary nature,128 it makes particular 
sense to extend the public trust doctrine‘s scope to the use of 
the resource.129 Indeed, many jurisdictions apply the public 
trust doctrine to management of water resources.130 
The first major decision to apply the public trust doctrine 
to water appropriation was National Audubon Society v. Supe-
rior Court of Alpine County.131 In this case, the Supreme Court 
of California expanded the public trust doctrine to include the 
allocation of water rights in specific circumstances, even when 
water had already been appropriated to a private party.132  
In holding that the public trust doctrine applied in these 
circumstances, the court looked both at the purpose and the 
scope of the doctrine within the state.133 The court discussed 
how the public‘s interest in water resources was not limited 
simply by the traditional triad of uses.134 Instead, the goal of 
the court in applying the doctrine was to protect water re-
sources for their current public use.135 In their assessment of 
 
the single strongest statement that historic uses must accommodate modern 
needs.‖).  
 128. As discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 31–34, an interest 
in water is usufructuary—meaning that it ―incorporates the needs of others.‖ 
Sax, supra note 82, at 485. It is thus necessary for the government to regulate 
water use for the benefit of the public and to take account of the public nature 
of the resource. See id.  
 129. See Sax, supra note 82, at 485 (noting that the usufructuary nature of 
the resource makes it necessary for the government to regulate public uses 
and that no other legal doctrine ―comes as close as does the public trust con-
cept to providing a point of intersection for the‖ relevant interests (footnote 
omitted)).  
 130. See Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Ex-
panding Traditional Notions of Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 
320 n.184 (2006).  
 131. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); see also Aladjem, supra note 127 (describing 
the use of the public trust doctrine in National Audubon Society to expand 
public water protections).  
 132. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728; see also Erik Swenson, Com-
ment, Public Trust Doctrine and Groundwater Rights, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
363, 369 (1999) (―[T]he court . . . further expands the scope of the public trust 
doctrine to include the allocation of water rights.‖).  
 133. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 719.  
 134. Id. (defining the traditional triad as including navigation, commerce, 
and fishing).  
 135. Id. (finding that ―one of the most important public uses of the tide-
lands‖ was ―the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they 
may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as envi-
ronments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which 
favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area‖ (quoting Marks v. Whit-
ney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971))).  
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the scope of the doctrine, the court held, as most American ju-
risdictions do, that ―the public trust is not limited by the reach 
of the tides, but encompasses all navigable lakes and 
streams.‖136  
Since the court found that the public trust applied to nav-
igable waterways, so long as the application was for modern 
public uses, the court thought that integrating the appropria-
tion system and the public trust doctrine was necessary.137 In 
doing so, the court found that the public trust doctrine can 
override the appropriations of waters both before and after a 
permit is allocated.138 It also found that the state has a duty to 
take the public trust into account when distributing permits 
under the state‘s system of water appropriation.139 Courts in 
other jurisdictions have followed the reasoning of the California 
Supreme Court;140 however, this extension of the doctrine is 
primarily in the western part of the country.141 
In states that have extended the public doctrine to the area 
of water appropriation, the legislature has a mandate to con-
sider the public trust when distributing permits.142 However, 
this is a limited remedy. Such application of the doctrine would 
not solve the problems faced by bulk water export.143 In this 
circumstance, the issuance and use of one permit could have 
serious ramifications for the individual state, as well as the rest 
of the country, because one permit could cause states to lose 
traditional legal authority over water resources if NAFTA and 
GATT are applied to bulk water export.144 Therefore, along 
with illuminating traditional concerns associated with the pub-
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 727–28.  
 138. See Swenson, supra note 132, at 371 (―According to the court, all prop-
erty rights in water are nonvested rights subject to revocation by the state if 
trust resources are harmed.‖).  
 139. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 727–28. 
 140. See e.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 
1988); In re Wai‗ola O Moloka‗i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 693 (Haw. 2004); Shokal v. 
Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 450–52 (Idaho 1985). For a case that dealt with this issue 
prior to National Audubon Society, see United Plainsmen Ass‘n v. N.D. State 
Water Conservation Comm‘n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976). 
 141. See Aladjem, supra note 127, at 20 (discussing how ―the public trust 
doctrine has become an accepted part of the legal landscape‖ in western 
states).  
 142. See id. (describing the status of the public trust doctrine in several 
states). 
 143. See id.  
 144. See id.  
 2011] BULK WATER EXPORT PROBLEM 759 
 
lic trust doctrine, a more traditional remedy—nullifying this 
type of sale—would also be necessary to solve the developing 
problem.145 If the state must simply take the doctrine into ac-
count, the doctrine still allows the state to lose traditional au-
thority over a resource which it holds for the people in trust.  
Although there are shortcomings to the application of the 
public trust doctrine in some states, progressive jurisdictions 
provide important illustrations of how the doctrine can extend 
beyond traditional water uses, as well as how a system can in-
tegrate a water rights regime with the public trust doctrine. 
Regardless of the arguments made for extensions of this doc-
trine, there are many commentators and state courts that are 
reluctant to extend the doctrine beyond its traditional use. The 
next Section articulates that, while state courts rightly take a 
limited approach to the public trust doctrine, in the context of 
bulk water invocation of the doctrine is entirely consistent with 
conservative judicial application.  
B. JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO EXTEND THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL AREAS OF NAVIGABLE AND 
TIDAL WATERS  
Some state courts are disinclined to expand the public 
trust doctrine beyond the traditional doctrine enunciated in Il-
linois Central.146 Critics have lodged three typical complaints 
against extension of the public trust doctrine, including a con-
cern that: the application undervalues the right to private 
property; the doctrine gives a court authority over complex ad-
ministrative decisions where it lacks expertise; and that the 
doctrine has an undemocratic nature.147 However, traditional 
concerns over the extension of this doctrine do not apply to the 
same extent when discussing bulk water export.  
A typical argument against extension of the public trust 
doctrine is its unnecessary intrusion on both private property 
rights and private conduct.148 For example, the New York 
 
 145. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892) (stating 
that the contract was revocable because the land was held in trust). 
 146. See Kanner, supra note 90, at 78, 81.  
 147. Araiza, supra note 97, at 402–03.  
 148. See, e.g., George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust 
Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 307, 322–41 (2006) (arguing that expansion of the public trust 
doctrine to environmental protection not grounded in natural law traditions 
would unnecessarily interfere with private property rights and result in im-
proper judicial activism).  
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Court of Appeals refused to extend the public trust doctrine to 
nonnavigable waters because it feared injecting uncertainty in-
to the investment of private property.149 Similarly, the Connect-
icut Supreme Court ruled that the public trust doctrine does 
not extend to the use of public parks, citing a concern for un-
reasonable intrusion on private conduct.150  
This concern does not, however, apply to the extension of 
the public trust doctrine to the bulk water context for two rea-
sons. First, because this is a developing market, courts would 
not ―inject uncertainty‖ because there is always ambiguity and 
uncertainty when new markets are created.151 In fact, courts 
would achieve the opposite end. By applying the common law to 
this water use, a court would create stability by ensuring the 
current permitting system is not interrupted by international 
agreements. Second, this intrusion is not ―unreasonable‖ be-
cause a right to water is usufruct, and private parties are on 
notice that water rights are subject to the beneficial interest of 
the public.152 Since permit applicants are on notice that the 
state may limit the manner and method of appropriation for 
the benefit of the state, it is reasonable for an applicant to as-
sume that state power extends to the courts in ensuring the 
public‘s interest is protected.153 Therefore, by extending the 
doctrine to bulk water export, a court is simply enforcing both 
the interest of other water right holders and the public general-
ly by protecting the current legal water rights structure.  
Another argument against the extension of the public trust 
doctrine is that it gives courts with very little expertise the au-
thority to affect and overrule technical administrative deci-
 
 149. See Douglaston Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201, 203–05 (N.Y. 
1997).  
 150. Leydon v. Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 564 n.17 (Conn. 2001) (confirming 
the private right to beach access but objecting to the claim that the doctrine 
extends to town parks). 
 151. Cf. Michael Korybut, Article 9’s Incorporation Strategy and Novel, 
New Markets for Collateral: A Theory of Non-Adoption, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 137, 
168–72, 177 (2007) (discussing how new markets create legal uncertainty 
about ―commercial reasonableness‖ in the Article 9 context). 
 152. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.  
 153. See Geoffrey M. Craig, House Bill 1041 and Transbasin Water Diver-
sions: Equity to the Western Slope or Undue Power to Local Government?, 66 
U. COLO. L. REV. 791, 819 (1995) (―[W]ater right holders have always been on 
notice that the police powers of the state may be reasonably exercised to limit 
the manner and method of appropriation in furtherance of legitimate state in-
terests such as health, welfare, and safety.‖). 
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sions.154 The structure of state legislative systems places a sig-
nificant amount of authority in administrative agencies be-
cause of their knowledge and expertise in the field.155 Conse-
quently, according to some commentators, when judges weigh 
in on technically complex decisions in the application of laws, 
judges should defer greatly to the expertise and decision-
making capacity of administrative agencies.156  
Fundamentally, this criticism does not apply to bulk water 
exports because it is not necessary for courts to make expert 
administrative assessments when applying the doctrine in this 
circumstance. Instead, a court follows a more traditional ap-
proach because issuance of a permit for bulk water risks state 
divestment of authority over water resources because of inter-
national treaty.157 This is similar to Illinois Central in that it is 
not the effect on the environment that initiates the protection, 
but the reality that the decision could result in the government 
losing its ability to regulate a resource under its control.158 
Thus, judges need not make complex scientific determinations 
and courts can freely apply the doctrine based on the effect on 
the public.  
The third argument against extending the public trust doc-
trine is that it is undemocratic in nature.159 It has been argued 
that the doctrine, when extended beyond traditional uses, be-
comes a tool to override the democratic process.160 Although the 
problems with bulk water could be resolved within the state 
legislative branch, the fact that one legislative or administra-
tive decision could forever change the water-rights system tips 
the scales toward application of the doctrine because it is ap-
plied to rectify the traditional concerns that traditionally call 
for the use of the doctrine to protect the interest of the public. 
This is true for two reasons. 
 
 154. Araiza, supra note 97, at 402–03. 
 155. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sove-
reignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA 
L. REV. 631, 688 (1986).  
 156. Id. 
 157. See supra Part I.B & C (discussing water rights in the United States 
and placing these rights in the context of GATT and NAFTA). 
 158. See Klass, supra note 84, at 705.  
 159. Araiza, supra note 97, at 402–03. 
 160. See James L. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A 
Comment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning 
and Johnson, 63 DENV. U. L. REV. 565, 583 (1986) (concluding that the doc-
trine is a ―tool[ ] for political losers or for those seeking to avoid the costs of be-
coming political winners‖). 
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First, this doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court in a 
circumstance where the state government was going to divest 
itself of authority to govern ―the whole of an area in which it 
has responsibility to exercise its police power.‖161 Therefore, the 
Court invoked the doctrine as a check on legislative power that 
would have damaging effects on the public‘s ability to use spe-
cific kinds of resources.162 Since the legislative power in this case 
would result in an unchangeable outcome,163 this circumstance 
seems well suited for application of the public trust doctrine.  
Second, permitting bulk water exports puts both historical 
and future needs at risk because the industry does not provide 
major benefits to the public.164 The international export of wa-
ter does not provide significant infrastructure to improve re-
gional economies or accommodate for increasing water needs.165 
In addition, the export of bulk water may have serious envi-
ronmental consequences leading to water shortages for the 
people of a state.166 This is the foundation of traditional public 
trust doctrine case law. The decision to offer full control of the 
harbor in Illinois Central was particularly extreme because it 
did not create any public development or produce more efficient 
services for the public.167 This also favors application of the 
public trust doctrine to bulk water exports because of the mi-
nimal benefits provided to the public in exchange for the state‘s 
control of water resources.  
 
 161. Sax, supra note 82, at 489.  
 162. See, e.g., Danielle Spiegel, Student Article, Can the Public Trust Doc-
trine Save Western Groundwater?, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 412, 438 (2010).  
 163. Unless a change was made to GATT or NAFTA.  
 164. See POLICY RESEARCH INITIATIVE, supra note 123.  
 165. See GLEICK ET AL., supra note 56, at 11–12 (arguing that resources 
like water that are sold as ―raw‖ goods, as opposed to value-added goods such 
as bottled water, ―involve much less investment‖ in the home nation because 
―little or no additional inputs are needed‖); NIKIFORUK, supra note 122 (ex-
porting water in its raw form means ―less water at home to create jobs and 
less water to sustain ecological services‖).  
 166. See MAUDE BARLOW, INT‘L FORUM ON GLOBALIZATION, BLUE GOLD: 
THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND THE COMMODIFICATION OF THE WORLD‘S WA-
TER SUPPLY 5–14 (rev. ed. 2001) (discussing some of the consequences of over-
using water). Although there is no guarantee that applicability of water re-
sources would impact the environment, especially with the exceptions in the 
GATT for ―exhaustible resources,‖ Nardone, supra note 54, at 200 (quoting 
GATT, supra note 10, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262), this Note posits that the potential 
harm to water resources is increased when a state loses its full ability to regu-
late the resource for the benefit of the public.  
 167. Sax, supra note 82, at 490, 495.  
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Therefore, the distribution of water rights for bulk water 
export provide the proper opportunity for courts to apply the 
public trust doctrine because arguments against its use are not 
sufficiently persuasive. Additionally, the issuance of a permit 
for bulk water export echoes many traditional legal reasons to 
protect the public from a legislative action. The extension of the 
public trust doctrine would provide the most efficient manner 
of avoiding the permanent consequences generated by the ex-
port of bulk water.  
III.  EXTENSION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO 
DENY APPROPRATION OF WATER RIGHTS FOR BULK 
WATER EXPORT   
The export of bulk water calls for the extension of the pub-
lic trust doctrine to protect the public from the potential conse-
quences associated with international trade agreements. First, 
the decision of state courts to extend the doctrine is appropriate 
because water is already a public good for the purposes of water 
allocations, therefore parties are on notice that their rights are 
impacted by the public generally.168 Second, state courts deci-
sions to extend the doctrine assuage the concern that govern-
ment would distribute permits for a temporary financial gain 
that is not in the best interest of the public.169 Last, the exten-
sion is supported by Supreme Court precedent because the 
state is potentially divesting its traditional authority to regu-
late water resources to a foreign entity.170  
A. EXTENSION OF THE DOCTRINE IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE 
WATER IS ALREADY A ―PUBLIC‖ GOOD FOR THE PURPOSES OF 
WATER ALLOCATION AND PARTIES ARE ON NOTICE OF THOSE 
PUBLIC RIGHTS 
The public nature of water lends itself to application of the 
public trust doctrine.171 Because an interest in water is usu-
fruct, it is necessary for the government to regulate water use 
 
 168. See generally Sax, supra note 82, at 485 (discussing water and proper-
ty rights outside the framework of bulk water).  
 169. See generally Klass, supra note 84, at 705 (discussing the public trust 
doctrine as a check on government mismanagement of public resources outside 
the framework of bulk water).  
 170. See generally Sax, supra note 82, at 489 (discussing state authority 
over public areas outside the framework of bulk water). 
 171. See id. at 485.  
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for the benefit of the public.172 In other words, most jurisdic-
tions traditionally view water as ―public property subject to a 
private use.‖173 While the use of the public trust doctrine has 
customarily been defined under the terms of navigation, com-
merce, and fisheries, many scholars argue that trust theory is 
sufficiently broad to encompass water rights more generally.174 
In the case of bulk water, use of the doctrine is necessary to 
protect the public‘s interest to the extent the state and local 
governments fail to fulfill the their duty to the public.175 The 
doctrine would protect the public from government decisions 
that affect the long-term prosperity of the state‘s water re-
sources by mandating the state fulfill its duty to issue water 
rights only to the extent they do not hurt the rights of other us-
ers or the public. 
B. EXTENSION OF THE DOCTRINE IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE  THE 
GOVERNMENT‘S APPROPRIATION OF THE RIGHT TO A PRIVATE 
PARTY MAY NOT BENEFIT THE PUBLIC  
Bulk water exports illustrate an instance where the gov-
ernment may provide a benefit for a private party for short-
term economic gain that does not create significant benefits to 
the public. This is similar to Illinois Central because there is no 
indication the public would benefit from sale of the resource.176 
The increase in demand for freshwater resources around the 
world, coupled with the potential for water-rich areas to in-
crease their revenue, will likely create the perfect storm for the 
development of this market.177 As the market grows and tech-
nology develops, smaller public entities like Sitka, Alaska will 
feel pressure to issue water permits to private companies to 
 
 172. See id.  
 173. Ronald B. Robie, The Public Interest in Water Rights Administration, 
23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 917, 923 (1977).  
 174. See, e.g., id. at 926–28. Some courts already extended the doctrine to 
water rights. See supra Part II.A.2.  
 175. Robie, supra note 173, at 927–28.  
 176. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (―The control 
of the State . . . can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in pro-
moting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any 
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remain-
ing.‖); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm‘n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 126 (Mass. 
1966) (―[W]e find no express grant to the Authority of power to permit use of 
public lands and of the Authority‘s borrowed funds for what seems, in part at 
least, a commercial venture for private profit.‖).  
 177. See generally GLEICK ET AL., supra note 56, at 2 (describing the devel-
oping water crisis).  
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profit from their resources. However, with a resource as valua-
ble as water, it is necessary to ensure governmental bodies take 
all relevant factors into account when determining whether the 
financial incentives provided by shipping water overseas are 
truly in the best interest of the state.  
It is true that state and local governments can make mon-
ey when allocating permits for bulk water export.178 However, 
there is no evidence that bulk water exports would actually pay 
the true worth of water to the people of the state.179 Nor is it 
clear that exportation would provide jobs for people within the 
state.180 Moreover, it may limit the economic opportunities for 
citizens to build domestic industries.181 Therefore, the problems 
created by bulk water allocation resemble those in Illinois Cen-
tral in which the state‘s economic gain did not provide any 
tangible benefits to the community.182 Thus, extension of the 
public trust doctrine is the most reliable way to ensure alloca-
tion of water rights provides some kind of benefit to the com-
munity and that state governments properly address the im-
pacts this export would have on society. 
 
 178. See, e.g., MARCEL BOYER, FRESHWATER EXPORTS FOR THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF QUEBEC‘S BLUE GOLD 25 (2008), available at http://www.iedm.org/ 
files/cahier0808_en.pdf (finding that a project to export water at $0.65 per cu-
bic meter could generate more than $16 billion in annual income for the prov-
ince of Quebec). 
 179. Cf. Kristin M. Anderson & Lisa J. Gaines, International Water Pric-
ing: An Overview and Historic and Modern Case Studies, in JEROME DELLI 
PRISCOLI & AARON T. WOLF, MANAGING AND TRANSFORMING WATER CON-
FLICTS 249, 249–65 (2009) (discussing how the true cost of water must be 
measured through consideration of operational and maintenance costs, capital 
costs, opportunity costs, resource costs, social costs, environmental damage 
costs, and long run marginal costs).  
 180. See James Feehan, Export of Bulk Water from Newfoundland and La-
brador: A Preliminary Assessment of Economic Feasibility, in MINISTERIAL 
COMM. EXAMINING THE EXP. OF BULK WATER, GOV‘T OF NFLD., EXPORT OF 
BULK WATER FROM NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR 35, 62 (2001) (―For a 
bulk-export-only operation, the employment levels would be quite modest, 
perhaps in the tens of jobs, even in a moderately large operation.‖); NIKIFO-
RUK, supra note 122 (discussing how the number of jobs created in a bulk wa-
ter market for Canada would be ―minimal‖). 
 181. See NIKIFORUK, supra note 122 (discussing how reduced water may 
mean reduced domestic industry). 
 182. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
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C. EXTENSION OF THE DOCTRINE IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE A 
STATE IS POTENTIALLY DIVESTING ITS TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY 
TO REGULATE WATER RESOURCES TO A FOREIGN ENTITY 
When it comes to jurisdictions that declined to expand the 
public trust to general water allocation, they should apply the 
doctrine to bulk water export because of the serious conse-
quences that may result from the state‘s divestment of a por-
tion of its allocation power to a foreign entity.183 A govern-
ment‘s issuance of a water right for bulk water export has more 
serious consequences because the state action may result in the 
transaction being regulated by NAFTA and GATT, resulting in 
the loss of a state‘s ability to supervise the extraction of its wa-
ter supply without outside interference.184  
Again, this situation is similar to Illinois Central185 be-
cause of the state‘s loss of authority over the resource.186 When 
applying the public trust doctrine to cases of general water al-
location, a court simply requires a state to consider the public 
trust when distributing water rights.187 The public trust is not 
asserted to prevent the harm to the public caused by the loss of 
regulatory control.188 When, however, it comes to bulk water 
export, the State‘s authority to control water resources is in 
jeopardy because one decision to export water could cause limi-
tation of a state‘s authority to regulate water transfers within 
its borders.189 It is, therefore, more similar to the sale of a har-
 
 183. See supra Part I.C (arguing that international treaties may result in a 
diminution of the state‘s traditional allocation power).  
 184. Id.  
 185. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 186. Compare Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 (voiding the grant of the har-
bor), with CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1117–18 (Alaska 
1988) (stating that the regulatory agency must consider the public trust when 
issuing permits), and Nat‘l Audubon Soc‘y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 
727–28 (Cal. 1983) (stating that when issuing permits the regulatory agency 
must consider the public trust doctrine), and In re Wai‗ola O Moloka‗i, Inc., 83 
P.3d 664, 690–94 (Haw. 2004) (stating that the public trust doctrine must be 
considered by a regulatory agency when issuing permits), and Shokal v. Dunn, 
707 P.2d 441, 450 (Idaho 1985) (discussing Idaho‘s permit application system), 
and United Plainsmen Ass‘n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm‘n, 247 
N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976) (articulating that the regulatory agency must 
consider the public trust when issuing permits). 
 187. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 727–28. 
 188. In water allocation cases the state retains the right to regulate. See, 
e.g., id. at 728 (stating that after the state approves a water appropriation, the 
―public trust imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use‖ 
of the water and that the state is ―not confined by past allocation decisions‖). 
 189. See supra Part I.C.  
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bor in that the State cannot regain control of the resource with-
out alternative means.190 As such, more traditional jurisdic-
tions should extend the doctrine because of the more serious 
consequences associated with bulk water export.  
Therefore, the public trust doctrine should be extended to 
bulk water sales in order to protect the public from the poten-
tial consequences associated with international trade agree-
ments. Expansion is warranted in even the most conservative 
jurisdictions because: water is already a public good for the 
purposes of water allocations;191 state court decisions to extend 
the doctrine assuage the concern that government would dis-
tribute permits for a temporary financial gain;192 and the ex-
tension is supported by Supreme Court precedent because the 
state is potentially divesting its traditional authority to regu-
late water resources to a foreign entity.193 
  CONCLUSION   
If NAFTA and the GATT become applicable to United 
States water resources, states may lose their authority to regu-
late these important resources. The best method for preventing 
this limitation is for states to deny permits for extraction of the 
resource for bulk water sale. However, because state govern-
ments have a short-term financial interest in selling permits, 
an additional check is necessary to protect the public‘s interest 
in these resources. Therefore, even more conservative jurisdic-
tions should apply the public trust doctrine to prevent the is-
suance of bulk water permits. This is the best solution because 
water is already ―public‖ for the purposes of water allocation, 
the benefits provided to society by the state‘s issuance of this 
kind of permit are minimal, and the consequence of permitting 
could result in the divestment of traditional authority to regu-
late water resources. Additionally, this application is different 
from liberal extensions for water allocation because it does not 
implicate concerns about undervaluing private property, giving 
courts authority over complex administrative decisions, or be-
ing too ―undemocratic.‖ As such, even conservative jurisdictions 
should apply the public trust doctrine to protect the water re-
sources of the United States from this dramatic loss of authority.  
 
 190. See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453. 
 191. See supra Part III.A. 
 192. See supra Part III.B. 
 193. See supra Part III.C. 
